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IN THE SUPREME COURT
Of THE STATE OF UTAH
RAY TANNER AND EDGAR L. VANCE
for themselves and as a class action on

behalf of all persons similarly situated,

Plaintiff - Appellants

vs.
!NTERMOUNTAIN FARMERS ASSOCIATION, aka UTAH POULTRY
AND FARMERS COOPERATIVE, a
Utah corporation,

Case No.
10306

Defendant- Respondent
APPELLANTS' BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
Class and individual action to determine share of undivided interest owned by each person for whom assets
are held in trust by Defendant, the rights and priorities
of each to those assets, for judgment for amounts found
to be due, for liquidation of Defendant Corporation,
attorney fees, costs and other general relief.

DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
District Court granted Defendant's motion to dismiss
Plaintiffs' complaint with prejudice.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs seek reversal of order dismissing thei·r com.
plaint, permitting them to amend if the complaint i
defective in any manner and ordering Defendant to
a responsive pleading thereto.

m:

STATEMENT OF FACTS
NATURE OF THE DEFENDANT COOPERATIVE
CORPORATION
Defendant is an agricultural cooperative association
organized for the benefit of its patrons to assist them in
purchasing and marketing agricultural products at cost
on a cooperative basis. Defendant's articles of incorporation and by-laws expressly state that Defendant shall at
no time own any property and that all assets held by
Defendant are the property and are held in trust for the
benefit of it's patrons. (R. 92)
OWNERSHIP OF AND ALLOCATION OF MARGINS
(PROFITS)
The earnings (profits) realized by the Defendant represent savings to the patrons resulting from cooperative
purchasing and marketing, are called "margins" and are
the property of the patrons. A portion of these "margins"
are allocated to the patrons by the issuance of "cert·
ificates" which are to be redeemed by Defendant in cash
at a future date. The balance of the "margins" realized
by Defendant are retained by the Defendant as
"reserves", however no "certificates" have been issued
by Defendant to evidence the share of those "reserves"
owned by each of Defendant's patrons, notwithstanding
Defendant's by-law No. 16 (R. 94) which requires the
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Defendant to maintain records which reflect the interest

of each patrons in such "reserves" and specifies that

said "reserves" will be "revolved" (redeemed in cash and
replaced by "reserves" created in later years). Defendant
has failed to maintain records as to the ownership of
each patron in said "reserves" and has failed to "revolve"
said "reserves."
ASSETS HELD IN TRUST BY DEFENDANT
The great mass of assets held by Defendant in trust
for it's patrons as aforesaid are co-mingled and have not
been physically segregated or earmarked to assign specific assets to the "reserves" or "certificates" shown as
liabilities on Defendant's books. In addition to working
capital made available to Defendant from said "margins"
and "reserves" the Defendant has obtained funds from
the sale of stock to it's patrons, has borrowed money from
it's patrons and from third parties. Additional value has
been accumulated by increase in value of properties held
in trust by Defendant for the benefit of it's patrons.
PURPOSE OF THIS LAWSUIT
The purpose of this lawsuit is to determine the ownership of the resulting mass of assets held in trust by Defendant for the benefits of it's patrons and the rights
and priorities of each of the owners. The acts and omissions of Defendant which have complicated the determination of that ownership and which will affect that
determination have been set forth in separate causes of
action in Plaintiffs' complaint.
The second cause of action (R. 92-93) asks for a
determination of the ownership of the assets held in trust
by Defendant. The first cause of action (R. 88-91) alleges
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that the determination of that ownership will re uir
.
·
" issued to alloc
q te
of " cert·f
I icates
a re-a 11ocat 10n
" margms
· " t o pa t rons an d the t h.ird cause of action
ae
(R. 93-94) alleges that it will be necessary to determine
the owneship of the "reserves."
The next three causes of action request a determination
of the respective rights and priorities of the owners in
and to those assets, and in particular the rights of patrons
who have ceased to market produce through Defendant
(4th cause of action - R. 94-95), the order in which
"certificates" should be "redeemed" by Defendant (5th
cause of action - R. 95) and whether Defendant should
be restrained from making further distribution of assets
or "redemption" of "certificates" until the ownership
and priorities of the assets is determined (6th cause of
action - R. 95-96).
The seventh cause of action (R. 96) requests liquid·
ation of the Defendant under general corporate law
(16 - 10 - 92, UCA, 1953) and the eighth cause of action
(R. 96-97) requests attorney fees.

PROPERTY OWNED BY ONE CLASS OF PERSONS
All of the causes of action deal with one single problem,
to-wit: that of adjudication of the ownership of, rights
concerning, priorities of the owners and claims concerning specific property held in trust by Defendant for
the benefit of it's patrons (Plaintiffs herein).
Defendant argues that a separate class of persons with
interests adverse to those of all other co-owners exists
for each year and for each of the sub-departments (wh'IC h
sub-departments were wrongfully created by Defendant
in violation of it's articles of incorporation and by-laws),

1
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that the named Plaintiffs are improper persons to represent these alleged classes of persons for years during
which the named Plaintiffs were not patrons of Defendant, and that separate persons must represent each
alleged class because the interests of each alleged class
is adverse to the interests of each other class.
Defendant's argument completely ignores the fact that
we have a single mass of assets held in trust by the Detendant with a large number of persons each owning
an unknown undivided interest in the mass of property.
All persons owning an interest in that property are
members of a single class. How each person acquired
his interest is merely evidence from which his ownership,
rights and priorities concerning that property will be
ascertained. Because the evidence will differ with various
of persons. This type of situation is precisely the situation
contemplated by Rule 23 (a) (2), URCP, under which
members of that class does not create different classes
this action is brought (see pages 10-11 of this brief)
HISTORY OF THIS ACTION
The first complaint filed herein (R. 1-9) was a class
action similar to the present case, except that it also
included a stockholders derivative action on behalf of
Defendant against the officers and directors of the Defendant. Defendant moved to dismiss that action because
the Plaintiffs represented adverse interests in that they
were both suing and suing on behalf of the Defendant
and Judge Hanson quite properly dismissed that action
with leave to amend. Defendant filed various motions
in addition to the motion to dismiss. (R. 14-25) which in
effect requested Plaintiffs to plead their evidence rather
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than ultimate facts. The Court suggested in the m· t
mu e
entry (R. 112) that in amending our complaint we "follow
the motion for a more definite statement" filed by Defendant (R. 14-19). The problems concerning identification of years, Defendants, acts and omissions, etc., complained of, were cured by the amended complaint filed
(R. 27-38) which complaint omitted all Defendants excep;
the present Defendant.
Defendant again filed the same series of motions
(R. 42-69), most of which again asked that Plaintiffs
plead their evidence. The argument of those motions
before Judge Hanson was reported (R. 153-205) and
primarily concerned allegations by Defendant concerning
res judicata (R. 44; 46-60; 159-173) and the sufficiency
ot the Plaintiffs' allegations concerning standing to sue.
(R. 253-256). The Court Ruled against Defendant on the
question of res judicata (R. 78) but again ordered the
complaint dismissed with permission to amend pursuant
to ground 1 of the motion to dismiss (R. 42, Par. 1) which
alleges that Plaintiffs have failed to specify their interest
or standing to sue. The Defendant's argument concerning
this point was primarily to the effect that the introductory paragraph of the complaint wherein the standing
of the named Plaintiffs and a description of the persons
constituting the class were alleged did not constitute
a part of any cause of action and therefore was insufficient. (R. 178)
COMPLAINT NOW BEFORE THE COURT
Plaintiffs then filed the second amended complaint
which is now under consideration (R. 87-99) which among
other things includes the introductory paragraph as a
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part of each cause of action and in addition alleges the
ultimate facts that the named plaintiffs and the other
members of the class who are "similarly situated" are
the owners of or persons entitled to share in the "assets,
net worth and or reserves" held in trust by Defendant;
that the Plaintiffs are a class of persons entitled to
maintain this action as a class action; that the members
of the class are so numerous as to make it impractical
lo bring them all before the Court; that the named
Plaintiffs adequately represent the class; that the rights
sought to be enforced are several and the object of the
action is the adjudication of claims which affect specific
property and that there are common guestions of fact
and of law affecting the rights of the members of the
class (R. 87-88).

The Defendant again refiled the same motions (R.
100-131) notwithstanding the Court's rulings concerning
the similar prior motions (R. 78). Judge Jeppson heard
the argument concerning these motions and not being
familiar with the prior proceeding again entertained
argument concerning all of said motions (R. 207-316)
and ordered the Plaintiffs' complaint dismissed with
prejudice (R. 137). The Court did not indicate the
reason for it's order (R. 137), however Defendant caused
an order to be signed by the Court (R. 138) stating the
motion to dismiss was granted in "all particulars," and
the Court declined to clearify that order (R. 143) although Plaintiffs moved the Court to specify the grounds
for the dismissal (R. 139).
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE COURT ERRED IN ORDERING PLAINTIFFS'
COMPLAINT DISMISSED
The order dismissing Plaintiffs' second amended complaint puts squarely in issue the question of whether
that complaint states a claim upon which relief can be
granted. This question necessarily involves the essential
elements of a pleading which are briefy discussed as
follows:
(a) Pleading ultimate facts. Rule 8 (a), URCP requires only that a complaint give to the opposing party
fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds of the claim
and a general indication of the type of litigation involved.
Blackham V. Snelgrove, 3 U. (2d) 157, 280 P. 2d 453, 455.
It is unnecessary to set forth in detail the conduct, language, or the artifices used to accomplish the result.
Wilson V. Oldroyd, 1 U. (2d) 362, 267 P. 2d 759, 763.
Most of the matters raised by the Defendant in it's
motions (R. 111-113) and arguments in support of those
motions (R. 254-270; 289-305) constitute a request that
the Plaintiffs plead their evidence, which fact was admitted by Defendant's counsel in open court (R. 305). If
the Plaintiffs' pleadings have offended Rule 8 (a) it is
probably by supplying Defendant with more detail concerning the lawsuit than is required by Rule 8(a).
(b) Demurrers. The order of dismissal of Plaintiffs'
complaint is in effect an order sustaining a demurrer to
that complaint. Rule 7 ( c), URCP reads as follows:
"Demurrers, pleas, and exceptions for insufficience
of a pleading shall not be used."
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Defendant's motions are not properly before the
Court. Defendant has raised many matters in it's motion
to dismiss that cannot properly be raised by motion and
which can be asserted in a responsive answer to Plaintrlfs' complaint. Rule 12 (b), URCP, which specifies how
defenses and objections may be presented reads in part
as follows:
(c)

"Every defense, in law or fact, to a claim for relief
in any pleading .... shall be asserted in the responsive pleading thereto if one is required, except the
following defenses may at the option of the pleader
be made by motion: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the
subject-matter, (2) lack of jurisdiction over the
person, ( 3) improper venue, ( 4) insufficiency of
process, ( 5) insufficiency or service of process,
(6) failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, (7) failure to join an indispensable party
... " (emphasis added)

Rule 7 (a) specifies that the only "pleadings" allowed
are complaints and answers or replies thereto, accordingly any defenses except those listed as itms ( 1) through
17) above must be asserted by Defendant in it's answer,
not in the present motion to dismiss. Rule 12 (b) provides
that the defenses specifically enumerated in sub-sections
O)through (7) of Rule 12(b), whether raised by motion
or by answer, can be heard at a preliminary hearing
prior to the time of trial. Since the only one of the seven
subdivisions listed in said Rule 12 (b) which is raised
by Defendant is sub-section (6) pertaining to "failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted," it
clearly appears that the other matters raised in that
motion such as res judicata, laches, statute of limitations,
capacity to sue, etc. could not properly be raised by
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motion and accordingly were and are not properly before
the Court.
Rule 8 ( c), URCP specifies the manner in which those
defenses are to be asserted in a pleading in a lawSU!.1
That rule reads in part as follow:
"In pleading_ to a preceding pleading, a party shall
set forth affirmatively ... laches ... res judicata
... statute of limitations ... and any other matter
constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense "
(d) Plaintiffs' capacity to sue. One of the primarv
arguments by Defendant is that the complaint fails t~
allege the standing or capacity of the Plaintiffs to maintain this action and to represent the class of persons
named as Plaintiffs herein. Rule 9(a) (1), URCP concerning capacity to sue reads as follows:
"CAPACITY. It is not necessary to aver the capacity
of a party to sue or be sued or the authority of a
party to sue or be sued in a representative capacity
or the legal existence of an organized association of
persons that is made a party. When a party desires
to raise an issue as to the legal existence of any
party or the capacity of any party to sue or be sued
in a representative capacity, he shall do so by specific
negative averment, which shall include such supporting particulars as are peculiarly within the
pleaders knowledge, and on such issue the party
relying on such capacity, authority, or legal existence, shall establish the same on the TRIAL.
(Emphasis added)

( e) Is this a proper class action? This action is brought
by the named Plaintiffs on behalf of themselves as individuals and as a class action on behalf of all persons
similarly situated. Defendants challenge the right to
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maintain this action as a class action at all. Rule 23 (a) (2)
reads in part as follows:
"If persons constituting a class are so numerous as

to make it impracticable to bring them all before
the court, such of them, one or more, as will fairly
insure the adequate representation of all may, on
behalf of all, sue or be sued, when the character of
the right sought to be enforced for or against the
class is
(1) ....

(2) several, and the object of the action is the adjudication of claims which do or may affect specific
properly in the action; or
(3) ... "
Defendant concedes that the members of the class
number tens of thousand of persons (R. 268), which
group is obviously too large of a group for it to be
practical to bring the members before the Court individually. The object of this litigation is the adjudication
of the rights of all of the owners of undivided interest
in and to the assets held in trust by the Defendant for the
benefit of it's patrons (the class of Plaintiffs herein), a
type of class action commonly referred to as a Hybrid
class action, and the judgment concerning which is res
judicata as to all members of the class only as to their
rights in the res in question. Salt Lake City vs. Utah
Lake Farmers Assn., 4 U (2d) 14, 286 P. 2d. 773, 780.
(f) Is Defendant a proper party to complaifn concerning the adequacy of Plaintiffs' representation of the
clas:-;? Defendant will not be injured by the determination
of the Court in this case, whether the action is maintained
by a few plaintiffs with a limited number of attorneys
ur whether a large number of plaintiffs join in the action

l
I

I
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with a multitude of counsel. Defendant can assert a
defense against the Plaintiffs herein that it could ny
.
assert
wit? . a larger number of named Plaintiffs, and the
dec1s10n of the Court as to the ownership of the assets
held in trust by Defendant and the rights and priorities
of each will be just as binding upon all persons who own
as interest in those assets as if all members of that class
were named individually as plaintiffs in this action. Salt
Lake City vs. Utah Lake Farmers Assn., 4 U (2d) 14, 286
P. 2d 773, 780. Defendant simply is not in a position to
complain as to the adequacy of the representation bv
Plaintiffs in this action. The question of the adequac~
of the representation is primarily a question as to the
competncy of counsel. There is no magic in numbers.
A similar class action has been upheld when brought
by a small number of milk producers who each had an
undivided interest in a fund created in connection with
the marketing of milk, to enjoin improper diversion of
that fund, notwithstanding the fact that the interest
of the named plaintiffs in that fund was small. Stark
v. Brannan, D.C.D.C., 1949, 82 F. Supp. 614. If any
members of the class, sought to be represented by the
named Plaintiffs herein, object to this proceeding they
can move to intervene in the action and object to the
adequacy of the representation by the named Plaintiffs.
The Court could properly order that notice of this proceeding be given to all interested parties or by publication
in a newspaper of general cerculation in the areas where
the class of Plaintiffs named herein reside in order to
give all opportunity to appear and object to this
proceeding if they desire to do so. Until a member of the
class sought to be represented objects to the sufficiency
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of Plaintiffs' representation of the class this question

is not properly before the Court.
Plaintiffs have alleged the ultimate facts that they
will adequately represent the class and all other essential
elements necessary to allege under Rule 23 (a) to sustain
a class action (R. 88). This creates an issue of fact and
of law which Defendants can only contest at the time
of the trial and not by motion, if in fact the Defendant
has any right whatever to contest Plaintiffs'. standing
to sue. The only persons who have moved to intervene
in this action are four persons who desire to be included
as named parties plaintiff and who want to persue the
same action against Defendant as is contained in the complaint on file herein. (R. 139; 165-167; 174; 206)
(g) Dismissal of individual action by named Plaintiffs. Even if the class portion of this action were subject
to dismissal, this action was filed by the named Plaintiffs
as "individuals" and also as a class action. The named
Plaintiffs have clearly stated a valid cause of action in
their individual capacities and that portion of the complaint should not be dismissed. Montgomery Ward & Co.
v. Langer, C.C.A. 8th, 1948, 168 F. 2d 182.
(h) The order of dismiJssal is in effect a summary
judgment in favor of Defendant. Rule 56 ( c), URCP,
pertaining to summary judgment reads in part as follows:
" ... The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on
file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law."
Courts are, and should be, reluctant to grant a summary
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judgment because litigants are thereby prevented fr
fully presenting their case to the Court. Brandt v S .om
.
.
· pnngv11le Bankmg Co., 10 U. (2d) 350, 353 P. 2d 460. A
Summary judgment must be supported by evidenc
admissions and inferences which, when viewed int:'
light most favorable to the loser, show that "there is n~
genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movina
party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law". Such
showing must preclude all reasonable possibility that
the loser could, if given a trial, produce evidence which
would reasonably sustain a judgment in his favor. Bullock
v. Desert Dodge Truck Center, Inc., 11 U. (2d) 1, 354 P.
2d 559, 561. A summary judgment is appropriate only
where the favored party makes a showing which precludes, as a matter of law, the awarding of any relief to
the losing party. Tanner v. Utah Poultry & Farmers
Co-op., 11 U. (2d) 353, 359 P. 2d 18. The last sentence
of Rule 12 (b), URCP expressly provides that under
certain cirumstances a motion to dismiss for failure to
state a claim for relief shall be treated as a motion for
summary judgment.
(i) Are interests of the named Plaintiffs adverse to
those of other members of the class? Defendant claims
that a new class exists for each year, for each department
and each class of certificate issued by Defendant and that
the interests of each of these classes are adverse to the
interests of the other alleged classes. Only one class of
persons exists, to-wit: the persons who are owners of
an undivided interest in the mass of assets held in trust
by Defendant for the bentfit of it's patrons. The det~r
mination of the ownership of these assets will necessarily
. 'll
require reference to the source of the assets, which WI
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include the earnings realized by Defendant for each year
and the manner in which the Defendant allocated a
portion of those earning each year by issuing "certificates" to patrons, however because of the failure of Defendant to issue "certificates" to evidence ownership of
the portion of each years earnings which were retained
by Defendant as "reserves" it is unlikely that the share
of any patron will be decreased to an amount less than
allocated to him each year by the issuance ·of "cert
ificates." In any event, the proper allocation of "margins"
and "reserves" are merely evidence to be used at the
trial of this matter to ascertain the undivided share of
the mass of assets owned by each patron and the priority
of each. Plaintiff does not seek judgment against any
patron who may have received more than his share of
assets from the Defendant and accordingly the interest
of any such patron, if any exist, is not adverse in this
lawsuit to the interest of the named Plaintiffs herein.
In any class action to adjudicate various claims to specific
property each member of the class will be interested
in obtaining the maximum share of the asset, and in that
sense there always will be some adverse claims between
the various claimants, however this is not the type of
adverse interest which will prevent the members of
that class from maintaining a class action. The purpose
of the rule is to permit an orderly adjudication of the
rights of numerous persons to a common fund and to
prevent a multiplicity of suits. It would be manifestly
impossible for each of the tens of thousands of persons
constituting the class in this action to each come before
the court with a separate lawsuit, and even if that did
occur the results would probably be inconsistent with
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each other and a fair distribution of the fund Would
probably be impossible.
(j) Is any claim of Plaintiffs' res judicata? Thi
question is not properly before the Court as indicated bs
the discussion under points ( c) and (b) above, and Judg~
Hanson indicated in his ruling that he was not impressed with the orgument relating to res ajudicata, since
the only party that this could possibly apply to would
be the plaintiff, Ray Tanner. (R. 78) The Court ruled
in the prior action between Mr. Tanner and the Defendant herein that the question of reallocation of "margins" was outside of the scope of the pleadings in that
case and refused to admit any evidence concerning those
matters. (R. 275) We concede that the issue of res
judicata, if properly raised in the answer and proven at
the time of the trial, may apply to the reasonableness of
"reserves" several years ago when that case was tried,
however Plaintiffs assert that the nature of operations
by Defendant have substantially changed since that
time to the extent that the Defendant has now discontinued a substantial part of it's operations and leased
many of it's facilities. R. 252) What may have been
reasonable "reserves" several years ago may now be
wholly unreasonable in view of changed circumstances.
In any event, the determination of the reasonableness
of the "reserves" only goes to the question of the right
of the parties to have those "reserves" distributed and has
nothing to do with determination of the ownership of
those "reserves," which is the primary question to be
resolved in this lawsuit.
(k) Did the Plaintiffs violate an order of the Court?
Defendant asserts that Plaintiffs' complaint should be
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dismissed in accordance with Rule 41(b), URCP, for
dolation of an order of the court, (R. 112; R. 255) and
cities an alleged minute entry concerning an order of
Judge Hanson which does not appear in the record, but
which is quoted by Defendant in it's motion to dismiss
!R. 112). That minute entry contains no more than a
suggestion and does not constitute an order within the
meaning of Rule 41 (b). In any event most of the problems
raised by Defendant in the motion for a more definite
statement referred to in that minute entry (R. 14-19)
were cured by deleting the other defendants named in the
original complaint, and the balance of the problems have
been cured by the second amended complaint and the
allegations contained therein which define the times,
events, persons and things in much more minute detail
than is required under our present "ultimate facts" rule.
CONCLUSION
Defendant holds a large mass of assets in trust for the
benefit of its patrons. The Defendant has not complied
with the requirements of it's By-laws and Articles of
Incorporation, which require that the records be so
maintained that the ownership of those assets can be
readily determined from the Defendant's records. It is
now necessary for the Court to determine that ownership
and the rights and priorities of the respective owners.
The named Plaintiffs, together with other persons who
desire to join as named plaintiffs, are members of the
class of persons who own the assets, to-wit: patrons of
Defendant who have contributed toward the acquisition
of the assets in question. As members of that group, Plaintiffs are proper parties to represent the owners of the
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property held in trust by Defendant in this class acti on.
Defendant is only the trustee of those assts and should
welcome an opportunity to determine the portion of those
assets owned by each person and the rights and priorities
of each. The only logical manner to determine said rights,
priorities and ownership is by a class action.
Plaintiffs should be given their day in court by setting
aside the order dismissing Plaintiffs' complaint and
ordering the Defendant to answer. If the Court is of the
opinion that the complaint is defective in any manner
an amendment should be permitted. In any event, the
action was also filed by the named Plaintiffs as an individual action on their own behalf and no grounds have
been alleged or proven which would support the Court
in dismissing that complaint.
Respectfully submitted,
Ronald C. Barker and Clarence J. Frost
2870 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

